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ICONS AND A.LIENS: LAW, AEsTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE. By John J. Costonis. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
1989. Pp. xix, 127. $22.50. 
In Icons and Aliens: Law, Aesthetics, and Environmental Change, 
John J. Costonis1 critically examines the expanding field oflaw loosely 
termed the law of aesthetics. This area of law concerns governmental 
efforts to maintain environmental aesthetics by imposing limits upon 
the use of private property.2 Costonis does not merely examine the 
status of the law, or rearticulate the policy concerns elucidated by 
courts. Rather, he advocates a fundamental change for the role of the 
law of aesthetics. He criticizes the development of the law to date for 
unduly focusing on the ''beauty" standard, wherein courts judge the 
aesthetic importance of environmental attributes in terms of how visu-
ally pleasing they are, and thereby decide whether or not to preserve 
or otherwise protect them (p. xv, 60-70). Costonis advocates a differ-
ent standard, a dichotomous paradigm that pits "icons" against 
"aliens." He defines icons as those environmental attributes for which 
there is a substantial arµount of human attachment; aliens are intru-
sions that threaten such icons. Costonis' fundamental argument is 
that a properly focused law of aesthetics would seek not to preserve 
beauty, but to preserve icons, protecting them from harm threatened 
by the encroachment of aliens (pp. xv-xvi, 45-51). 
Centuries ago, aesthetic legal issues simply did not exist. Impor-
tant cultural landmarks, for example, were simply designated by the 
King, Emperor, or Pope, without explanation, justification, or dispute 
(p. 13). Even in this country, institutional recognition of a law of aes-
thetics occurred only quite recently. Early formalist legal thinkers re-
fused to recognize government's ability to infringe upon the rights of 
private property and free expression.3 Not until 1926 did the Supreme 
Court legitimize public control of privately held land through zoning 
ordinances.4 Later, in the watershed case Berman v. Parker, 5 the 
1. John J. Costonis is Dean of the School of Law and Milton R. Underwood Professor of 
Free Enterprise at Vanderbilt University. He is also the author of SPACE ADRIFr: LANDMARK 
PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE (1986). Icons and Aliens is based in part upon his 
.earlier article, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. 
L. REv. 355 (1982) [hereinafter Law and Aesthetics]. 
2. Costonis draws mainly on examples of historical preservation and urban renewal, but his 
analysis similarly implicates other cultural phenomena. See p. xviii. 
3. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 
N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (1~5) (striking down mu.'licipal ordinances which regulated the size of 
advertising billboards); see also Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. City of Denver, 47 Colo. 
221, 107 P. 261 (1910). 
4. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (permitting a village to enforce 
a zoning ordinance that would diminish the value of some real property within its control). 
5. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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Court held constitutional the massive urban renewal efforts under-
taken by the city of Washington, D.C. This case was widely under-
stood to signal the Court's willingness to allow government efforts to 
beautify communities; for the law of aesthetics, it marked a startling 
break with the past (p. 23). Lower courts completely reversed their 
attitudes toward aesthetic initiatives, and legislatures responded with 
an outpouring of statutes and statutorily created administrative agen-
cies, mainly for the purposes of historic preservation and urban re-
newal. 6 The judiciary, taking Berman as a high court harbinger of a 
new direction for this area of the law, seemed amenable to almost any 
such program, and began to function as little more than a rubber-
stamp reviewer of these efforts. Costonis quotes Norman Williams, 
whom he describes as "one of the deans of American land use law," as 
commenting, "[i]n no other area of planning law has the change in 
judicial attitudes been so complete."7 
As Costonis correctly notes, such a judicial attitude gave short 
shrift to the need to limit preservation. The decision to designate a 
structure as a landmark may create a host of associated economic re-
straints; it certainly prohibits owners from doing certain things with 
their property, perhaps even forcing upon them financial burdens of 
restoration and upkeep. 8 For Costonis, the "legal subsidies" attending 
such decisions necessitate ensuring that landmark designations, as well 
as other aesthetic initiatives, enjoy popular support.9 Moreover, be-
yond this economic reasoning, uninhibited preservation just seems 
plainly unnecessary. As a director of economic development in Buf-
falo, New York, said, "[i]t's important to hold on to symbols of the 
past ... [but] how many symbols do you need?"to 
6. See pp. 23-25. Even the roots of environmental legislation can be traced to Berman. P. 
25. The author cites as an example the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4321 (1988) (requiring the submission of "environmental impact statements" to governmental 
agencies before proposed developments will be approved). P. 25. 
7. P. 23 (citing 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§ 11.02 (1974)). 
8. Costonis recounts the experience of Sandra and Robert Wagenfeld, who bought a house in 
the Greenwich Village neighborhood of Manhattan that had an abandoned gas station, dating 
from 1922, in the backyard. The couple had planned to demolish the gas station and replace it 
with a garden until the city intervened. In addition to denying them permission to level the 
structure, the city actually demanded that the Wagenfelds pay $100,000 to restore it. Pp. 75-76. 
According to Costonis, "such affirmative obligations are not unusual." P. 76. 
9. [A] powerful subsidy, coextensive with lost liberties, results every time the law is en-
listed in aid of a social impulse. As a society committed to a broad range of personal and 
economic freedoms, we presume that we should not grant these legal subsidies in the ab-
sence of persuasive reasons for doing so. Confidence that we can define what we expect to 
achieve by legalizing the impulse is imperative. So too is assurance that the social gains and 
losses attending the subsidy will meet with broad citizen support. We seek to be persuaded 
as well that the law can handle the assignment faithful both to the impulse and to its own 
integrity. When in doubt on these matters, the proper course is to withhold the subsidy, 
leaving the groups who favor and oppose the impulse to slug it out among themselves. 
P. 12. 
10. P. 40 (quoting Buffalo's Grain Elevators: Inspiration or a Blight? N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 
1984, at A40, col. 1). 
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The post-Berman judiciary, however, tended to ignore the negative 
side of rampant preservation. Especially in the specific area of historic 
preservation, where very loose standards guided the determination 
that a structure had historic value, courts approved governmental aes-
thetic initiatives with very little scrutiny.11 This created an incentive 
for some to pursue historic designations as a means to a less laudable 
end, and many private interest groups manipulated aesthetic legal 
rules to their advantage. Costonis quotes Beverly Moss Spatt, former 
chair of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission: 
"[P]eople are requesting and gaining designation for a whole array of 
[improper] reasons: to maintain the status quo, to prevent develop-
ment, to revitalize an area, to gentrify or gain tax benefits."12 
One manifestation of this problem, New York City's decision to 
designate the Isaac Rice mansion a historic landmark, serves as a 
touchstone for Costonis' analysis (pp. 4-8). This Upper West Side 
building had been owned for some years by the yeshiva Chofetz 
Chaim, who used it to house a religious school for Jewish children. 
Facing a shortage of funds, the yeshiva decided to move the school to 
a less lucrative location, and arranged to sell the mansion, at a sub-
stantial profit, to a developer who planned to build a high-rise apart-
ment building on the site. Neighboring residents objected to this plan, 
however. Wishing to keep their quaint community from taking on the 
appearance of the nearby Upp,er East Side where such high-rises 
predominated, these West Side residents banded together to oppose 
the new development. They did not, however, sue to enjoin the con-
struction of the planned building. Since the high-rise would be per-
missible under the governing zoning laws, such legal relief would have 
been difficult to obtain. Instead, the neighborhood organization clev-
erly appealed to the city to have the mansion designated a landmark.13 
The mansion, "[a]n eclectic blend of Beaux Arts and Neo-Georgian 
styles" (p. 4) dating from 1901, was the lone neighborhood survivor 
from an earlier era when similar structures prevailed. AB such, it did 
have a certain historic interest that might, with persuasion, win sup-
port from a preservation-minded city agency, whom the post-Berman 
11. Costonis quotes Clifford Weaver and Richard Babcock, who commented that "historic 
has come to mean practically anything that, in some fashion or other, is not run-of-the-mill." P. 
30 (citing C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZoNING: THE ONCE AND F'uTuRE FRONTIER 35 
(1979)). 
12. P. 30 (citing Spatt, When the Landmaker Law is Misused, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1980, at 
A16, col. 5 Qetter to the editor)). 
13. Costonis notes "historic preservation laws ..• afford immeasurably greater protection 
against neighborhood change than do zoning laws." P. 25. This was undoubtedly true here; the 
Board of Standards and Appeals, the city's governing authority for reviewing zoning appeals, is 
not eager to grant zoning variances. Indeed, one developer recently was ordered to remove the 
top twelve floors of an already constructed 31-story Upper East Side building that, apparently 
due to a mistake in reading a city map, had been erected in violation of the city's zoning rules. 
Dunlap, Developer Agrees to Plan to Cut 12 Floors from a Too-tall Tower, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 
1991, at Bl, col. 2. 
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judiciary had shown a willingness to follow. 14 Advocates both for and 
against preservation of the mansion intensely lobbied the Board of Es-
timate, the city agency responsible for approving landmark designa-
tions. Interestingly, the debate surrounding the mansion controversy 
largely ignored the architectural qualities of the mansion. In the end 
the Board, by a divided vote, approved the designation of the mansion 
as a landmark; the yeshiva's development plans were foiled. 15 The 
neighbors had successfully used the law of historic preservation to ef-
fect local zoning, a technique now pejoratively dubbed "landmarking 
by ambush" (p. 8). 
Underlying the Rice Mansion dispute is the idea that law is appro-
priate to control the visual appearance of cities. Currently, courts ex-
ercise such control by judging the aesthetic merit of the structures 
involved. Costonis criticizes this "beauty approach" on several fronts 
(p. 60). He sees the focus on sensory reactions to environmental at-
tributes as being too simplistic, ignoring the attendant cultural and 
intellectual qualities of the attribute (p. 61 ). Furthermore, the beauty 
approach does not contextualize the environmental attribute; a better 
standard would view the attribute not in isolation, but rather with re-
gard to its relationship to its surroundings (pp. 68-70). More funda-
mentally, the beauty approach fails in application, since no objective 
criteria exist for evaluating beauty.16 
Costonis acknowledges that these weaknesses may be unavoidable 
when curators make aesthetic judgments for museums. But for a 
court, which makes legally binding pronouncements, he considers 
such shortcomings to be fatal flaws. In an attempt to devise a better 
test, Costonis looks behind the legal rules and focuses on the societal 
side of legal aesthetics. The purpose of landmark preservation is to 
protect buildings not for their own sake, but rather because people 
have emotional attachments to them. Costonis therefore argues that 
the proper gauge of aesthetic initiatives should not focus on the formal 
qualities of the attribute but rather on the human responses it creates: 
14. The agency had the power to designate as a landmark any structure that possessed "spe-
cial character'' or "special historical or aesthetic interest or value." Under such broad, vague 
standards it would be difficult for a reviewing court to overturn its edicts. P. 5; see supra note 11 
and accompanying text. 
15. P. 8. The yeshiva, however, was not alone. Ownership of a landmark- designated build-
ing by a financially struggling religious institution is actually quite common. See Stipe, Historic 
Preservation: The Process and the Actors, in THE AMERICAN MOSAIC 6 (R. Stipe & A. Lee eds. 
1987). The experience of New York City continues to fit this rule - quite recently, St. Bartholo-
mew's church "lost what it presented as a life-and-death struggle" to build a skyscraper on its 
property; in the process, it "came to epitomize the religio~ community's struggle against the 
landmarks law." Dunlap, SL Bart's to Open Its Doors to an Adversary, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1991, 
at A25, col. 2. Facing the multimillion dollar costs of maintaining its landmarked buildings, the 
church found it necessary to initiate a sizable fundraising campaign. Id. 
16. "Law knows nothing about beauty. It can set speed limits or require that contracts be in 
writing, but it can neither create beauty nor issue ukases guaranteeing that others will do so. The 
Constitution conthlns no recipe for beauty." P. 9. 
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"Experience teaches [that i]n legal aesthetics people come first; their 
emotional investment in environmental features, second; and the for-
mal qualities of these objects, last" {p. 45). To reinforce this point, he 
skillfully supplements his analysis with photographs and cartoons, 
which convincingly accentuate the emotional attachments to environ-
mental attributes in a way that the printed word alone cannot.17 He 
concludes legal aesthetics should make preservation of social stability, 
rather than beauty, its overriding goal; to this end, he advances the 
icon/alien standard. 
Under his view, icons are not objects of "beauty," but environmen-
tal attributes for which there is significant aggregate human attach-
ment. Icons provide communities with a sense of stability, order, and 
reassurance; with their loss comes great sorrow {pp. 46-47). Environ-
mental attributes can become icons through their history, their con-
tinuity with their surroundings, or their symbolic meaning, each of 
which may satisfy a fundamental human need for stability. Aliens, 
conversely, threaten this sense of stability; they are directly counter-
posed to icons.18 The clash of alien and icon occurs because "the as-
sociations bonding an icon to its champions fail to jibe with those 
imputed to the alien."19 
Costonis' arguments to jettison the beauty standard in favor of his 
icon/alien construct is convincing. Despite assertions to the con-
trary,20 the beauty standard is too fundamentally subjective to be use-
ful for reviewing landmark designations.21 The icon/alien construct is 
less subjective: community attachment is easier to measure than aes-
17. Costonis' recognition of the human impact of cartoons 1s not unique. For example, his-
torians and others have recognized that Thomas Nast's campaign of cartoons in Harper's Maga-
zine had a devastating effect upon William "Boss" Tweed and his associates. See M. KELLER, 
THE ART AND PoLmcs OF THOMAS NAST 177 (1968). The law has recognized this as well. 
"Nast's castigation of the Tweed Ring, ••. and numerous other efforts have undoubtedly had an 
effect on the course and outcome of contemporaneous debate. • . . From the viewpoint of history 
it is clear that our political discourse would have been considerably poorer without them." Hus-
tler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1988). 
18. The symmetry is not total, however. Icons can stand alone, whereas aliens exist only in 
opposition to icons (p. 55), a fact that often makes them more difficult to pinpoint (p. 51). 
19. P. 57. In the Rice Mansion example, the true icon for the neighbors was not the man-
sion, but the Upper West Side itself. The West Side residents were not genuinely interested in the 
mansion; they simply employed landmark designation as a means to preserve their neighbor-
hood. The alien, under this construct, was the proposed high-rise building. P. 46; see generally 
pp. 45-70. 
20. Seep. 108 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 
(1978) ("[T]here is no basis whatsoever for a conclusion that courts will have any greater diffi-
culty in identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the context of landmark regulation than 
in the context of classic zoning or indeed in any other context.")); see also Duerksen, Local 
Preservation Law, in A HANDBOOK ON HISrORIC PRESERVATION LAW 79 (1983) ("The [Penn 
Central] Court rejected out-of-hand the contention that regulation of landmarks is inevitably 
arbitrary because it is a matter of taste."). 
21. See, e.g., Goldstone, Aesthetics in Historic Districts. 36 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 379, 
379 (1971) ("From Socrates to Santayana some very ugly arguments have taken place over the 
question of what is beautiful and what is not."). 
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thetic beauty. Moreover, grounding preservation in community at-
tachment is simply a much more defensible policy than the 
preservation of beauty for its own sake. Making the law of aesthetics 
work to facilitate a sense of stability in the community is a difficult 
policy to assail. At first blush, therefore, the icon/alien paradigm 
sounds quite promising. Yet it leaves for the law too limited a role. 
Able only to monitor social stability, the law cannot sanction positive 
aesthetic efforts. Although Costonis himself seems to recognize this 
limitation,22 he nonetheless restricts his paradigm to this role of pre-
serving stability, excluding any consideration of how the law might 
encourage creative aesthetic initiatives. 
Consider the example of the Louvre in Paris. Few would doubt 
that the Louvre is a giant cultural icon, not only for the Parisians but 
for the world at large. Recently, in celebration of the bicentennial of 
the French Revolution, the French government solicited ideas for an 
addition to the Louvre. The renowned architect I.M. Pei proposed to 
interpose a modernistic glass pyramid upon the Louvre's stately court-
yard. 23 Judging by its clear contrast to the Baroque-Renaissance style 
of the existing building, in form, construction, composition, and tone, 
most would certainly describe it as an alien under Costonis' para-
digm. 24 Yet, over objections rooted no doubt in similar sentiment, the 
proposal was approved, and the addition was built. The obvious ques-
tion is: were the French wrong to impose this seeming alien upon such 
an important and widely recognized icon?25 
The example is not meant to test Costonis' icon/alien construct in 
application, but rather to expose its limitations. That is, not being so 
presumptuous as to question the propriety of the French planners' de-
cision, one must admit that the usefulness of the icon/alien dichotomy 
is lost. The architect Pei envisioned an addition whose contrast with 
the original structure would give viewers of the Louvre a new appreci-
22. "[There is] a question that merits a successor volume: Aie we overdoing our commit-
ment to icons? Reassurance and stability are important, even indispensable in our lives, but so 
too are innovation and autonomy." P. xviii. 
23. See Miller, A Castle Under the Louvre, 176 NATL. GEOGRAPHIC 102, 107 (1989). 
24. Civic hostility to the juxtaposition of a pyramidal structure against a more familiar set-
ting is not unique to the French. See State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 308 
(Mo. 1970) (The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the denial of a building permit for a "residence 
... of a pyramid shape."). But see Smothers, A Pyramid in Memphis Brings Accusations But No 
Glitter Yet, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1991, at Al2, col. 2 ("For two years [the city of Memphis, 
Tennesse] has lived with the expectation that a monumental steel and glass pyramid would rise 
and become the clarifying symbol of Memphis, just as the Empire State Building symbolizes New 
York."). 
25. Of course, as a formal legal issue this example is somewhat off point. The usual context 
for disputes over preservation occurs when the government in some way acts to restrain a private 
owner of property. The Louvre, being publicly owned, is not such a case. Yet because it presents 
a stark contrast of forms in a widely known context, it is a useful example to confront, as Cos-
tonis would, a "broader inquiry into the linkages among ourselves, our symbolic environment, 
and the law." P. xviii. 
May 1991] Politics, Law. and Society 1795 
ation of the building. 26 By imparting this new vision, the Pei addition 
challenges viewers, and may even be said to educate them. Yet Cos-
tonis' model would not allow such a result, since the glass pyramid 
must almost certainly be described as an alien threatening the Louvre, 
an undisputable icon. The model is thus exposed as denying the law 
the capability to recognize these types of educational functions that an 
environmental attribute may serve. 
Such a role for the law seems to be in order, as confirmed by an-
other recent example, from the Bedford-Stuyvesant community of 
Brooklyn, New York.27 In the course of an urban renewal project, 
developers discovered artifacts from a forgotten community of suc-
cessful nineteenth-century African Americans. Community leaders 
seized upon this finding, and a movement to preserve the remains of 
the community - termed·, "Project Weeksville" - ensued. Ulti-
mately, the project was a success; Project Weeksville had an "electrify-
ing effect" on the community.28 But it is important to note that the 
sentiments of the community at large were not the impetus behind this 
effort. "The purpose of the project was to provide a sense of continuity 
of culture to those who lived in the immediate neighborhood and to 
acquaint black people with the richness of their heritage even beyond 
Weeksville."29 Presumably Costonis would condone the concern for 
"continuity" underlying this effort. But the effort departs from his 
strict stability standard in that the decisionmakers involved with Pro-
ject Weeksville employed the law positively, engendering rather than 
awaiting a feeling of community association. Mere scattered artifacts 
would most likely never fuel any far-reaching community attachment; 
the preservationists therefore used legal aesthetics to spark such a 
sentiment. 
Reactions to Pei's Louvre addition may be mixed, at least for 
now,30 but it is hard to argue against the propriety of something like 
26. One could argue that Pei's addition did not threaten the Louvre icon, but rather en-
hanced it, and therefore the glass pyramid was not in fact an alien. It is doubtful, however, that 
Costonis himself would make such a logical stretch. He sees "[c]onservation, not creativity, [to 
be] legal aesthetics' province." P. 68; see infra note 31. 
27. See Lee, Discovering Old Cultures in the New World: The Role of Ethnicity, in THE 
AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 15, at 191. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. (emphasis added). 
30. One wonders if the Pei addition will enjoy the same fate as its Parisian companion, the 
Eiffel Tower. Costonis' narrative is instructive: 
Prior to its erection in 1899 and its planned demolition twenty years later, it was scorned as 
the "dishonor of Paris" by Gounod, Prudhomme, and other members of the Committee of 
Three Hundred (one member per meter of the tower's height). Implored the group: "Is 
Paris going to be associated with the grotesque mercantile imaginings of a constructor of 
machines ... ?" Yet the tower still stands, now as the beloved signature of the Parisian 
skyline and an officially designated monument to boot. 
P. 64. Elsewhere the author's tone is even stronger: "[T]here is a sense in which the Eiffel Tower 
is Paris." P. 18. 
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Project Weeksville. Although the legal recognition of these remains 
preceded any widespread attachment to them, the beneficial effect on 
the community more than justified the effort. Yet the icon/alien 
model seems to leave no room for such developments; only environ-
mental attributes for which there is already community attachment 
are proper for the law to recognize.31 Project Weeksville highlights 
this limitation as a failing of Costonis' proposed construct. 
Adoption of the icon/alien construct is the first half of Costonis' 
solution. The second half centers on implementation. Having out-
lined the legal rubric, Costonis must ascertain how the legal system 
will apply it. For Costonis, determination of icons is a simple matter: 
legal decisionmakers must look to the wishes of the communities. 32 
When a community has a sufficient emotional stake in an environmen-
tal attribute, it should be adjudged an icon, worthy of legal protection. 
In essence, then, Costonis puts his faith in the institutional processes 
of our legal system to effectuate his scheme for the preservation of 
icons.33 
To Costonis, the Rice Mansion landmark designation resulted 
from a clear failure of legal process. What was essentially a zoning 
issue became a historic preservation issue. This characterization prob-
lem was complicated by the loose standards guiding the determination 
of landmarks, which merely required a structure to possess a "special 
character'' or "special historical or aesthetic interest or value" (p. 5). 
This combination of mischaracterization and loose, vaguely worded 
standards, left the process guiding the Rice Mansion designation ripe 
for manipulation.34 Adoption of the icon/alien standard, in contrast, 
would focus attention on the real issue at hand. Properly framed, the 
31. Costonis seems to recognize this problem. He notes that "[p]opular support for sound 
aesthetics policies may fail to emerge absent legislative leadership [and] .•• education and public 
relations efforts." P. 85. But he limits such efforts to "get[ting] a line on community attitudes 
through hearings and other public proceedings." Id. Although he sees the need to encourage 
communities to express previously felt, but possibly not clearly understood, attachments, he 
shows no inclination to support the legal recognition of educational initiatives like Project 
Weeksville. 
Other language from the book reinforces this interpretation. Costonis asserts "the law ••• is 
reactive, not prescient." P. 85. "The law cannot identify icons in advance of their appearance in 
the culture, serendipity not being its strong suit." P. 58. A similar view surfaces in his discus· 
sion repudiating the beauty standard. "Law cannot create beauty anew. More modest and deriv-
ative, its charge is to safeguard icons." P. 80 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, he states 
"[c]onservation, not creativity, is legal aesthetics' province. What is being conserved, of course, 
is the icon, which comes to the law's attention only after it has achieved that status in the com-
munity's mind." P. 68 (emphasis in original). 
32. This idea is certainly not a novel one. "The first requirement of a sound body of law is, 
that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right 
or wrong." o. HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 36 (M. Howe ed. 1963). 
33. Costonis sees legal process issues as crucial to the fair working of his scheme. He has 
previously recognized "the overriding importance of the process values that the rule of law 
should and must safeguard, even at the cost of foregoing particular desired outcomes, if need be." 
Law and Aesthetics, supra note 1, at 358 n.5. 
34. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
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question before the Commission would have been whether the Rice 
Mansion was an icon worthy of preservation; the effect of the pro-
posed high-rise upon the West Side neighborhood should not have af-
fected the decision. Whether or not the West Side neighborhood was 
an icon worth preserving, and whether the proposed high-rise was a 
sufficiently destructive alien as to warrant an injunction, would be is-
sues for a zoning commission or a court, but were not proper consider-
ations for the agency whose function was to designate landmarks. 35 
Recently the legal process techniques embraced by Costonis have 
been questioned by both the left and the right. Adherents of the law 
and economics school of thought would either privatize the law of aes-
thetics or discard it altogether. Costonis scolds these critics for being 
too willing to give up all the positive results of the infant law of aes-
thetics in reaction to some negative results (pp. 13-15). Using the 
jargon of law and economics, he notes that the privatization or aban-
donment of legal aesthetics would neglect the many "symbolic exter-
nalities" that clashes between icons and aliens impose upon the 
community at large. 36 He also points out a practical problem with this 
view: at this point there is no turning back-the law of aesthetics is 
now so entrenched, as both a social and legal norm, that the complete 
reversal these critics advocate is simply impossible. 37 
Recent critical legal scholars, as well as those who write from criti-
cal race and feminist perspectives, have begun to advocate more sub-
stantive, rather than process-oriented, reforms for the law. Costonis 
advocates a general method for icon determination, wherein courts, as 
well as administrative agencies, respond to community sentiment. He 
thus avoids any articulation of substantive norms, such as architec-
tural standards, to use within this method. Costonis does recognize 
that this is "a question the law cannot answer from within" (p. 36). 
35. Although the final result may have been for the best, such a failure of legal process is 
troubling. If the icon had been properly recognized, a court or zoning commission might not 
have considered the alien - the proposed new building - a sufficient threat to prohibit its 
erection. Furthermore, zoning rules would not prohibit the demolition of the mansion; rather 
they would proscribe the permissible limits of what could be built in its place. A development 
upon the Rice Mansion property that did not destroy the character of the West Side could there-
fore receive legal approval. 
36. If economists can think of the environment as a Monopoly board on which economic 
games are played, why can't the rest of us think of it as a stage rich in icons invested with 
and broadcasting our deepest religious, artistic, social, and personal commitments? I have 
no quarrel with theorists who advise that a leading purpose of land use law is "externalities 
control," that is, keeping the soot from your factory from dirtying the laundry hung in my 
backyard. But if land use theory is to reflect what people actually seek from public govern-
ance, it must go beyond soot and laundry. 
"Symbolic externalities" distress people no less and, often, more, for we experience in-
compatibility as a clash among the messages we associate with the environment's icons and 
aliens. Driving every legal regime framed to nurture the aesthetics impulse, I am convinced, 
is the effort to prevent or minimize such associational dissonance. 
Pp. 16-17. 
37. "[W]e are condemned to come to terms with aesthetics, whether we like it or not. Aes-
thetics considerations are ubiquitous ..•• " P. 15. 
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But he declines to address directly the question: what ought the sub-
stantive values of a society be? 
Illustrative is his description of the timely problem of gentrifica-
tion. Young affluent buyers move into a declining neighborhood, ren-
ovate old decaying houses, and restore what had been a dilapidated 
residential area (pp. 37-38). As a result, real estate prices escalate, 
neighborhoods are designated as historic districts, with accompanying 
restrictions on use and affirmative duties of care, and tax rates rise. 
Consequently, the original residents tend to be constructively forced 
out of the neighborhood.38 Application of the icon/alien model to this 
situation becomes confusing. The icon may be the old houses; the 
alien, old age and disrepair. Or, the icon may be the original neighbor-
hood, possessing a vibrant character despite the decaying physical 
structures; the alien, the "yuppie" invaders. But having exposed this 
dilemma, Costonis fails to resolve it. He concludes by merely posing 
the question "how would you vote?" (p. 37). He declines to provide 
any definite answer. 
As already noted, Costonis avoids such substantive inquiries 
through his reliance on a democratic politics standard. This is prob-
lematic, however, most notably because the likely result of such a 
majoritarian approach would be discriminatory. Preservationists, the 
initial and therefore crucial decisionmakers in the preservation 
scheme, are an essentially homogenous lot.39 Since legal deci-
sionmakers will most likely be more sympathetic to sentiments charac-
teristic of the communities from which they hail, it would not be 
surprising to see discriminatory thresholds employed for the recogni-
tion of icons. Specifically, those icons held genuinely meaningful to 
communities that lack legal empowerment may be less likely to be rec-
ognized than those icons championed by communities that the law has 
traditionally favored. Experience tells us who wins in the gentrifica-
tion scenario posed above.40 The Project Weeksville example is simi-
38. But see Lee, Discovering Old Cultures in the New World: The Role of Ethnicity, in THE 
AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 15, at 199 ("[D]isplacement must be viewed more as a result of a 
complex array of urban forces than a single phenomenon, such as historic [district 
designation]."). 
39. "[T]he preservation profession is nearly devoid of minorities and recent immigrants." Id. 
at 204. 
40. The following comment is illustrative: 
The problems of preserving the ethnic and social flavor of a place arise most often and most 
readily in the displacement issue - gentrification as it has come to be called, wherein low-
income and minority families and the elderly are displaced as the result of increased prop-
erty values resulting from the new popularity of inner city neighborhoods. As learned from 
the experience of cities such as Savannah, Georgia; Charleston, South Carolina; Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania; and elsewhere, it is possible to reduce the problem to some extent, but rarely 
with unqualified success. 
Stipe, The Next Twenty Years, in THE AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 15, at 277. 
The problem with gentrification is not exclusive to inner-city neighborhoods. In Guilford, 
Maryland, for example, a small, low-income African-American community is quietly disappear-
ing at the hands of developers catering to young professional couples who wish to live in the 
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larly telling; had the discovery been made thirty years earlier, or in the 
Upper West Side rather than in Bedford-Stuyvesant, the legal reaction 
would have certainly been much less favorable to preservation. Be-
cause of this amenability toward discriminatory application, the legal 
process solution is not very satisfying.41 
It is possible that Costonis overlooks these problems because of his 
unabashed enthusiasm for the law of aesthetics. He writes optimisti-
cally on the future of this area of the law: "Aesthetics and law are an 
odd couple .... I write as a marriage counselor ... [who] want[s] this 
marriage to work" (p. 1). Costonis criticizes those who would con-
clude from the Rice Mansion and like examples that the law of aes-
thetics should be discarded, comparing such thinking to "throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater" (p. xvii). Rather, he seeks to examine 
the history of the law of aesthetics, clarify the issues, and offer a way 
to improve the process. Extending his matrimonial metaphor, he an-
nounces "the honeymoon has ended and the hard work of making the 
marriage work lies ahead" (p. 1 ). 
Despite some serious problems, Icons & Aliens is clearly an influen-
tial and exciting development in this field. Costonis has provided a 
clear analytical framework for the issues, in contrast to the muddle 
presented by the case law. The icon/alien standard is a prominent 
improvement over the currently and historically popular beauty stan-
dard. Moreover, the attention to the human needs and responses un-
derlying the legal rules results in a book that is entertaining for the 
nonlegal as well as the legal reader. Although this replacement is not 
without faults, the book is nonetheless an important first step in a criti-
cal reappraisal of the law of aesthetics. 
- Scott Schrader 
economically active area. One such affiuent newcomer recognized that a sense of history and 
community might exist in what is left of the original neighborhood, yet still dismissed it as "a 
bunch of decrepit-looking buildings," griping "[y]ou'd think they'd want to clean up the area." 
Shen & Jennings, Patchwork Development Passes by Working Poor, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1991, at 
Bl, col. 2. 
41. Even when recognized, icons may suffer from discriminatory treatment. In South Caro-
lina, there are three national historic districts. One of these districts, which contains a one-time 
school for freed slaves (now called the Penn Center), suffers from deterioration and decay, while 
the other two, the downtown districts of Beaufort and Charleston, thrive. 
It's symbolic of the inequities that still exist between the races in this nation . . . . Black 
people, by and large, are still not capable of donating the kind of money necessary to their 
institutions as whites are able to do. We have made efforts to raise money from both sides, 
and we haven't been able to get it from either. 
Schneider, Historic District in South Carolina Struggles to Preserve Black History, N.Y. Times, 
May 26, 1991, at A22, col. 1 (quoting Emory Campbell, director of the Penn Center). 
